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1 Introduction
In the debate regarding the eﬀects of globalization, economists often take
the rigorous neoclassical paradigm of trade as their starting point.1 Canon-
ical versions of that paradigm assume that property rights are perfectly
and costlessly enforced. Under such conditions, greater trade openness and,
more generally, globalization are typically found to be beneﬁcial. However,
in many circumstances, property rights either are not well-deﬁned or are
costly to enforce. It is, therefore, only natural to ask how such deviations
from the canonical paradigm of trade would inﬂuence our assessment of
globalization.2
For the most part, economic analyses of imperfectly enforced property
rights have concentrated on open-access resources—ﬁsheries, environmen-
tal resources, the commons in general—in which over-exploitation is the
main source of ineﬃciency. With regard to the eﬀects of globalization,
Chichilnisky (1994) and Brander and Taylor (1998) have shown how remov-
ing the barriers to trade of an open-access resource can further stimulate its
over-exploitation and lead to lower welfare.3
In this paper, we adopt a diﬀerent approach, one that enables us to
explore an altogether diﬀerent set of ineﬃciencies arising from imperfect
property-rights enforcement in relation to globalization—namely, the costs
of enforcement and conﬂict within a country.4 Some costs of enforcement,
1See, for example, Bhagwati’s (2004) multi-faceted discussion of the beneﬁts of glob-
alization. Stiglitz (2002) provides a diﬀerent view, emphasizing the role of ﬁnance and
international organizations, such as IMF and the World Bank.
2The speciﬁcation and enforcement of property rights in a modern economy would
seem to require (i) the presence of a state that can deﬁne these rights legislatively, (ii) an
independent judiciary and non-corrupted power to enforce them, and (iii) the ﬁscal abil-
ity to maintain that infrastructure. Olson (2000, p.183) dubbed the modern markets that
require property rights speciﬁcation and enforcement, in contrast to the spontaneous mar-
kets of much of history that can rely on self-enforcement, as socially-contrived. However,
even a near-complete speciﬁcation of property rights cannot ensure costless enforcement.
Given the resources devoted to enforcement by the state, individual parties may need to
spend time or money on litigation and related activities to defend their rights.
3Hotte et. al. (2000) examine the eﬀect of trade in an open-access resource but also
allow for private enforcement and its evolution in a dynamic context.
4Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) have adopted
this approach to explore the welfare consequences of greater openness in the presence
of conﬂict between nations who possibly trade with the rest of the world. See Barbieri
and Schneider (1999) for a review of the recent scholarship, produced largely though not
exclusively by political scientists, on trade and conﬂict. This scholarship has resulted
primarily in two opposing views: (i) the liberal view, that trade between nations would
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such as those reﬂected in the resources regularly expended in litigation and
related activities as individuals and groups try to protect their rights, are ob-
served everywhere, even in high-income countries. Many countries, however,
face more severe and costly enforcement problems that manifest themselves
in a variety of forms of domestic conﬂict, including strikes and lockouts, mil-
itary coups, low-level ethnic, religious or class rivalries, as well as rampant
basic insecurity that the state is simply unable to curtail. As Rodrik (1998,
1999) has argued, managing such conﬂicts is critical for successful economic
development. An even more important case of problematic enforcement is
simply that of civil wars. The economic costs of civil conﬂicts have been
overwhelming during the post-World War II period. The costs range from
the resources allocated directly to arming and those destroyed in the strug-
gle to the indirect losses associated with a reduction in investment and trade
due to greater insecurity as well as other allocative eﬀects that can extend
well beyond the duration of the war.5
We suppose that a potentially tradeable natural resource, like oil, is
contested by diﬀerent domestic groups.6 The degree of openness to interna-
tional markets faced by the contending parties aﬀects not only the stakes of
the contest (the value of the disputed resource), but the opportunity costs
of contestation and conﬂict as well. To highlight the ways in which openness
matters, we examine conﬂict in a small country under two polar regimes:
autarky and free trade. One possibility is that free trade induces less arm-
ing and less domestic conﬂict, in which case free trade unambiguously yields
eﬀect or, at best, no eﬀect.
5Recent studies of these eﬀects, conducted by researchers at the World Bank, are
distilled in Collier et. al. (2003). With the methodology developed by Lucas (1987) to
estimate the welfare costs of the business cycle, Hess (2003) estimates the welfare costs
of conﬂict coming from its eﬀects on consumption alone for 147 countries spanning the
period 1960–1992 to be on average 8 percent of steady-state consumption. The individual
estimates for some countries are, not surprisingly, a bit smaller. For the United States,
for example, the estimated cost is 3.2 percent. However, even this estimate is far greater
than the Lucas-type estimate of the welfare cost of the business cycle in the United States
[Hess, p. 17]. Moreover, the estimates for some lower-income countries are dramatically
higher—e.g., the cost is 65 percent in Iraq and 40.5 percent in Angola.
6For a survey of the various contested natural resources around the globe and the
problems they induce, see Klare (2001). There is now a fairly sizeable empirical literature
on the relationship between a country’s natural resource wealth and civil war. As discussed
by Ross (2004) in his synthesis and review, the evidence is quite mixed; and while there
appear to be some regularities, very little has been done to distinguish between diﬀerent
theoretical explanations. To get a ﬂavor for some of the diﬃculties inherent in empirical
work of this kind, see Sambanis (2004). While we do not add directly to the empirical
literature, our framework oﬀers new insights of relevance for the theory.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 3
higher welfare. The other possibility is that free trade induces more arming
and conﬂict; in this case, the familiar gains from trade must be balanced
against the increased costs of arming and conﬂict. Some of our main ﬁndings
are summarized below.
First, importers of the contested resource under free trade unambigu-
ously gain relative to the autarkic regime. In addition to realizing the regu-
lar gains from trade, such countries also experience a reduction in their costs
of conﬂict. To be more precise, because the price of the contested resource
is lower in global markets, its price under free trade is lower than it would
be under autarky. As such, removing the barriers to trade with other na-
tions reduces the conﬂict at home, thereby increasing welfare by more than
it would were property rights perfectly and costlessly enforced.
Second, exporters of the contested resource under free trade could lose
in comparison to autarky. The closer the international price of the contested
resource is to its autarkic price, the more likely is such an outcome. At the
autarkic price, there are no gains from trade, and the levels of conﬂict under
the two regimes are identical. But, as the international price of the contested
resource rises above its autarkic level, a shift to free trade intensiﬁes domestic
conﬂict so that its costs are higher than the gains from trade. Only when the
international price of the contested resource rises above some threshold are
the gains from trade suﬃciently high to compensate for the (still increasing)
costs of conﬂict, so that trade becomes preferable to autarky.
Third, an increase in the international price of the contested resource
could reduce the exporting country’s welfare. More likely when the interna-
tional price is especially close to its value under autarky, this eﬀect could be
viewed as an instance of the “natural resource curse”—that is, the tendency
for natural-resource abundant countries to have weak economic growth (see,
for example, Sachs and Warner 1995 and Ross 2003).7 The reduction in
welfare reﬂects an increase in the intensity with which groups contest the
resource as its value rises in global markets over a certain price range, gener-
ating a higher cost of conﬂict that swamps the larger gains from trade that
also come with the higher price.8
7See Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2003) for an overview of this literature.
8Dal B´ o and Dal B´ o (2004) similarly ﬁnd that an increase in the international price of
the natural resource can induce a greater degree of conﬂict; however, the source and the
nature of conﬂict in their analysis diﬀer from ours. The particular mechanism we study is
closer to that featured in Hodler’s (2004) analysis of rivaling groups, though his emphasis is
more on the degree of fractionalization, whereas ours is on the degree of insecurity—which
depends on institutions. Indeed, the evidence presented by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik
(2002), that the curse is associated only with countries having weak institutions, suggestsGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 4
Fourth, for a certain range of international prices, domestic conﬂict re-
verses the country’s comparative advantage. To be more precise, if all prop-
erty were perfectly secure or costlessly enforced such that there were no
conﬂict between groups, the country would be a net-importer of oil over
that price range; domestic conﬂict, however, implies that the country is in-
stead a net-exporter. More generally, whether the international price of oil
falls within that range or not, the conﬂict that emerges between groups as
they compete for control of the natural resource distorts their production
decisions, to reduce the quantity of other commodities supplied domestically
relative to the aggregate domestic supply of the contested resource; in short,
domestic conﬂict imparts a positive bias on the country’s net export of the
contested resource (oil) relative to the benchmark case where property is
secure. Our analysis implies, then, that a country’s trade pattern is not
invariant to the emergence of domestic conﬂict. Treating the trade pattern
of any of the many countries that experience civil wars and other forms of
domestic conﬂict as indicative of their true comparative advantage either in
empirical studies or for policy purposes appears unjustiﬁed.
Finally, as a country becomes richer in “oil” or when the degree of inse-
curity rises, the range of international prices for which autarky is superior
to free trade and the range over which the natural resource curse occurs
widen; that is, both endowments and “institutions,” the latter in the form
of security, determine the welfare consequences of globalization.
2 The basic setting: contesting a resource
We present our analysis in the context of a highly simpliﬁed neoclassical
model of trade, modiﬁed to allow for imperfect property rights enforcement.
Despite the simplicity of the model, our ﬁndings are qualitatively robust;
and, in a supplementary appendix, we show how the results can be general-
ized in an extended version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade.9
Consider a country populated by N groups, indexed by i. Each group i
is endowed with Ti and Li units of secure land and labor, respectively, which
can be used to produce consumption goods. For simplicity, we assume here
that there is only one potential use for land, the extraction of oil, and that
one unit of land yields one unit of oil. Labor, however, can be used to
that institutions matter for understanding regularly observed variation in the eﬀects of
resource booms. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2003), who study an alternative mecha-
nism which is based on electoral politics and resource extraction, also rely on diﬀerences
in institutions (degrees of security) to explain the observed cross-sectional variation.
9See, in particular, Appendix B.2.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 5
produce, also on a one-to-one basis, butter as well as guns. Let Gi denote
group i’s level of arming or guns.10 Then, Li − Gi (≥ 0) units of labor
will be available for the production of butter; therefore, group i’s maximal
production of butter will be max{Li − Gi,0}.
Oil and butter are ﬁnal consumption goods, produced under perfectly
competitive conditions. They can be traded domestically or, depending
on the trade regime, internationally. Let Oi and Bi represent group i’s
consumption of oil and butter respectively. The preferences of each group i
take the Cobb-Douglas form,
U(Oi,Bi) = (Oi)α(Bi)β, (1)
i = 1,2,...,N, where α ∈ (0,1) and α + β = 1.
We suppose that groups have secure possession over the goods they pro-
duce and over those they exchange, as well as the endowments we have la-
belled as “secure.” Where our analysis departs from much of the economics
literature on trade lies in the assumption that there exists some additional
property within the country, T0, which groups contest.11 All groups would
like to take control of the contested territory, particularly for its oil. How-
ever, due to imperfect institutions of governance and enforcement, claims
to this territory can be settled only via overt conﬂict or, equivalently in our
model, under the threat of conﬂict.
It is precisely the contestability of this territory that motivates groups
to allocate resources to arming. In particular, a group’s production of guns
enhances its chances of securing T0 and the oil it contains. But arming is
costly. To produce an additional gun, a group must forego the production
of some butter. Below we explore how groups balance these eﬀects at the
margin and especially how trade openness inﬂuences the trade-oﬀ for guns-
versus-butter production. As will become obvious below, the eﬀects depend
critically on the ratio of insecure land in the country, T0, to the country’s
aggregate endowment of land, ¯ T ≡ T0 +
PN
i=1 Ti. Henceforth, we will refer
to this ratio as the degree of insecurity, and denote it by τ = T0/¯ T ∈ [0,1].12
10Note that “guns” can stand for any costly appropriative activity that subtracts from
useful production and welfare—e.g., ordinary rent-seeking, inﬂuence activities or litigation.
11Insofar as exchange reﬂects the factor content of goods traded, it should not matter
for our central results whether the commodities or the factors used to produce them are
subject to dispute.
12As suggested above, the degree of insecurity, which we treat as exogenously deter-
mined, would depend on the strength of the state’s institutions of governance and en-
forcement. But, as will become evident below, the intensity of conﬂict as reﬂected in the
production of guns, is determined endogenously, depending on, among other factors, the
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We model intergroup interactions, given τ > 0, as a winner-take-all
contest, in which the probability that group i emerges as the winner, qi,
depends positively on the relative amount of guns it produces. To be more
precise, let the aggregate quantity of guns produced by all groups be denoted
by ¯ G ≡
PN
i=1 Gi, and the vector of guns that excludes Gi by G−i. Then,






Gi/ ¯ G if ¯ G > 0
1/N otherwise,
(2)
for i = 1,2,...,N. According to this speciﬁcation, group i’s probability of
winning is increasing in its own allocation to arms, qi
G i > 0, and decreasing
in the allocation to arms by all other groups, qi
Gj < 0, j 6= i.13
The timing of actions is as follows:
(i) Each group i chooses its allocation of labor to guns production, Gi,
taking the other groups decisions, Gj j 6= i, as given. Let G denote
the vector of all groups’ gun choices. The implied production of butter
for each group i is max{Li − Gi,0}.
(ii) Given the choices of guns (G) and the technology of intergroup conﬂict
as described in equation (2), one group emerges as the “winner” of the
contest and takes control of the disputed land; if group i is the winner,
its land endowment and thus production of oil are Ti +T0; otherwise,
its land endowment and production of oil are Ti.
(iii) Then, given the production of butter and oil by all groups, competitive
trade takes place.
We examine the incentives to arm and the resultant welfare of each group
under two polar trade regimes: autarky and free trade. Under autarky, there
is no trade with the outside world, and prices are determined domestically
within an integrated market. Under free trade, assuming that the country
is small, prices are given in international markets.
13First introduced by Tullock (1980), this functional form has been used extensively in
the rent-seeking literature as well as in the literatures on tournaments and conﬂict and






j), where f(·) is a non-negative, increasing function. Also
see Hirshleifer (1989), who investigates the properties of two important functional forms
of this class, including the “ratio success function,” where f(G) = G
m with m > 0, which
simpliﬁes to (2) when m = 1.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 7
To derive the expected payoﬀs under these two regimes, we need to
identify ﬁrst the indirect utility functions implied by (1) and describe some
of their properties. To proceed, let e Ti denote group i’s contingent land
endowment, where as previously described,
e Ti =

Ti + T0 if group i emerges as the winner in the contest;
Ti otherwise.
for i = 1,2,...,N. Furthermore, let p denote the relative price of oil mea-
sured in units of butter. The production structure speciﬁed above implies
that the prices of guns and labor are also 1. We can now write group i’s
contingent income or revenue function as
Ri ≡ R(p, e Ti,Li − Gi) = p e Ti + Li − Gi, (3)
i = 1,2,...,N. Abstracting from international transfers of income, aggre-
gate expenditure on butter and oil must be equal to this measure of income
or GDP.14 Imposing this constraint at the group level, group i’s contingent
indirect utility function implied by (1) can be written as
V i ≡ V (p,R(p, e Ti,Li − Gi)) = µ(p)
h
p e Ti + Li − Gi
i
, (4)
i = 1,2,...,N, where µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α represents each group’s marginal
utility of income. One can verify that group i’s contingent demand and
supply functions for oil are respectively αRi/p and e Ti; therefore, group i’s





− e Ti, (5)
i = 1,2,...,N, which is positive if the group demands oil and negative if it
supplies it.15
Diﬀerentiation of group i’s indirect utility function with respect to the
relative price, p, and its guns, Gi, using (5), yields




14GDP, as typically measured, includes expenditures on arming. Since such expendi-
tures are not productive and arms are not directly consumed, their inclusion in GDP
makes this aggregate a misleading measure of welfare.
15It is worth noting at this point that our assumption that the utility function is homo-
geneous of degree one implies that each group behaves as if it is risk neutral. Speciﬁcally,
for any given choice of guns, each group i would be indiﬀerent between (a) engaging in
actual conﬂict where q
i equals the probability it will win the entire plot of the contested
land and (b) dividing the contested land in which case q
i equals group i’s share. The
reader is free to use either interpretation of the model.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 8
i = 1,2,...,N. The ﬁrst term inside the brackets weighted by the marginal
utility of income represents the welfare eﬀect of an exogenous price increase.
If group i’s excess demand for oil (Mi) is positive, the eﬀect is negative; oth-
erwise, the eﬀect is positive. The second term inside the brackets, similarly
weighted by the marginal utility of income, represents the marginal cost to
group i of producing an additional gun, given e Ti. When group i produces
more guns, its production of butter must fall, implying (for ﬁxed e Ti) less
income and a reduction in its overall welfare.
Given the allocation of resources to the production of guns by all groups,
(G), the relative price of oil that solves
PN
i=1 Mi = 0 is the market-clearing
price that will prevail in the country in the absence of international trade
(autarky). Denoting that price by pA, where “A” indicates the value of the










To ﬂesh out some of the implications of this expression, let the aggregate
labor endowment be denoted by ¯ L ≡
PN
i=1 Li, and recall the analogous









As revealed by this expression, pA does not depend on the distribution of
either labor or land across groups; nor does it depend on the distribution of
guns. Instead, it depends only on the aggregate quantities. Note especially
that, when a greater share of the country’s aggregate labor endowment is
allocated to guns production, ¯ L− ¯ G, the amount of butter produced domes-
tically necessarily falls; hence, as (7) shows, pA depends negatively on the
aggregate level of guns, ¯ G. This property holds more generally, as long as
guns production is more labor intensive relative to the country’s labor-land
endowment ratio.16
3 The no-conﬂict case as a benchmark
Before exploring the consequences of trade openness under conﬂict, it is
helpful for later comparisons as well as for developing some intuition for our
results to consider brieﬂy the hypothetical case in which property rights are
perfectly secure—that is, when there is no dispute over land (τ = 0) such
16See Appendix B.2.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 9
that groups have no incentive to arm ( ¯ G = 0). Equation (7) implies that,




β ¯ L/¯ T = α
βl (8)
where l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T indicates the country’s aggregate labor-land endowment
ratio. In turn, summing (3) across the N groups shows that, under autarky
with complete security, the country’s national income is ¯ Rn
A = pn
A ¯ T + ¯ L =






β ¯ T, (9)
where as previously deﬁned, µ(p) ≡ ββ(α/p)α.17 The welfare of the individ-
ual groups can similarly be written as functions of their initial endowments.
In the case of identical groups, the welfare of each one would be ¯ Wn
A/N.
Under free trade, the relative price of oil p would be given by interna-
tional markets. Then, with the maintained assumption of complete security
of land endowments, aggregate welfare, again calculated using (4), would be
¯ Wn
T (p) = µ(p)(p¯ T + ¯ L) = µ(p)(p + l)¯ T. (10)
Supposing that groups are identical, the welfare of each would be ¯ Wn
T (p)/N.
As one can easily verify, ¯ Wn
T (p) is a strictly quasi-convex function of p,
reaching its minimum at pn
A, as depicted in Figure 1. To the left of pn
A
where the international price of oil is lower than the autarkic price, the
country would import oil and export butter. To the right of pn
A, where the
international price of oil is higher than the autarkic price, the country would
be an exporter of oil and an importer of butter. Clearly, in the hypothetical
case where the groups’ land endowments are perfectly secure, welfare would
be at least as high under free trade as that under autarky.
4 Conﬂict under alternative trading regimes
We now consider the case where groups’ land endowments are not fully se-
cure, τ > 0, resulting in domestic conﬂict. First we examine the equilibrium
allocation of resources under the regime of autarky and then we turn to the
equilibrium allocation under the regime of free trade.
17Using the solution for p
n
A shown in (8) with this deﬁnition for µ(p), one can verify
that aggregate welfare under autarky in this benchmark case simpliﬁes to ¯ W
n
A = ¯ L
β ¯ T











Figure 1: Free trade without conﬂict
4.1 Autarky
Under autarky, given the country’s aggregate production of guns, ¯ G, the
relative price of oil is determined by (7), regardless of the outcome of the
contest for control of the territory under dispute, T0. Group i’s land endow-
ment will equal Ti+T0 with probability q(Gi,G−i) and Ti with probability





pA(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi
, (11)
i = 1,2,...,N, where, as deﬁned above, G represents the vector of gun
choices by all groups i = 1,2,...,N, and qi is speciﬁed in (2). We suppose
that each group factors in the eﬀect that its own choice of guns has on
the relative price, pA. However, groups make their choices simultaneously.
Given our speciﬁcations for production, preferences, and the contest success
function, a unique Nash equilibrium can be shown to exist.
At an interior optimum Gi∗
A ∈ (0,Li), the following condition is satisﬁedGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 11










+ Li − Gi∗
A












where c Mi denotes group i’s expected excess demand for oil, which is derived





pA(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi∗
A

− (Ti + qiT0),
i = 1,2,...,N. The ﬁrst term inside the brackets in the last line of (12)
weighted by the marginal utility of income represents the net expected mar-
ginal beneﬁt of guns, keeping the autarkic price pA constant. As described
earlier, the production of an additional gun enhances group i’s chances of
taking control of the disputed land, T0 and the oil contained therein. As
long as the relative price of oil pA is not too low, this expected net beneﬁt is
positive. The second term inside the brackets, again weighted by the mar-
ginal utility of income, represents the indirect eﬀect that an additional gun
would have on group i’s expected payoﬀ by inﬂuencing the relative price of
oil. The sign of this indirect eﬀect depends on whether the group is a net
buyer c Mi > 0 or seller c Mi < 0 of oil.
In what follows, for ease of comparison, we suppose that groups are




c Mi = 0, it follows that no group expects to be a net seller
or buyer of oil: c Mi = c M = 0, for all i.18 Groups behave, in this case, as
if they can have no inﬂuence on the country’s autarkic price. Accordingly,
group i’s optimizing choice of guns satisﬁes the condition, qi
GipAT0−1 = 0.19
18Note that our assumption of ex ante homogeneity does not preclude trade. Speciﬁ-
cally, interpreting the conﬂict over T0 as a winner-take-all contest, there will be ex post
heterogeneity: the group that takes control of the land and its oil emerges as the sole
net seller of oil, whereas all other groups emerge as net buyers. However, when we in-
terpret q
i as shares instead of probabilities, the assumption that groups are identical ex
ante implies that they are identical ex post as well. As such, there would be no trade:
M
i = c M
i = 0 ∀ i.
19Even if groups were not identical, this condition would be the relevant one, provided
that each group behaved as a price taker in its choice of guns.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 12






ατ(N − 1)¯ L





βN + ατ(N − 1)
, (13b)
where as previously deﬁned τ ≡ T0/¯ T > 0 indicates the degree of insecurity.
As (13a) shows, the optimizing choice of guns, G∗
A, is strictly positive as long
as there is more than one group in competition for T0 (N > 1) and depends
positively on the autarkic relative price of oil, p∗
A. It is also necessarily less
than the group’s labor endowment, ¯ L/N.
The solution in (13b) shows that the autarkic price itself p∗
A, like the
autarkic price under “Nirvana” pn
A = αl/β, is increasing in the aggregate
labor endowment relative to the aggregate land endowment, l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T. But,
in contrast to pn
A, p∗
A is decreasing in the degree of insecurity, τ, and in the








βN + ατ(N − 1)
(14)
is strictly less than 1 for τ > 0 and N > 1, and also decreasing in the
degree of insecurity, τ ∈ (0,1), as well as in the number of groups, N > 1.
The eﬀects of τ and N on the ratio p∗
A/pn
A can be attributed to labor being
an essential input into the production of guns. Speciﬁcally, with either
a larger τ or N, the conﬂict at home becomes more intense, implying a
greater diversion of resources away from the production of butter and a
higher relative price of butter or equivalently a lower relative price of oil.20





βN + ατ(N − 1)
 ¯ TNl
βN + ατ(N − 1)
, (15)
where µ(p) ≡ ββ(α/p)α represents the marginal utility of income as deﬁned
earlier. It is straightforward to show that autarkic aggregate welfare in the
absence of conﬂict, ¯ Wn
A, is always greater than autarkic aggregate welfare
20As noted below, these eﬀects hold for more general production structures, assuming
that oil (butter) production is more land (labor) intensive, where the labor-land factor
intensity ratio in the production of guns exceeds the labor-to-land endowment ratio, l.
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under conﬂict, ¯ W∗
A.21 As such, under the maintained assumption that groups
are identical, the welfare of any individual group would be lower under
conﬂict as well.22
The following proposition summarizes our main ﬁndings thus far:23
Proposition 1 (Autarky) Suppose that competing groups are identical
and that barriers preclude trade between countries, but groups within a
given country may trade freely.
(i) The autarkic price under conﬂict (p∗
A) is strictly less than the autarkic
price under no conﬂict (pn
A) and is decreasing in the degree of insecurity
(τ). Furthermore, the ratio of p∗
A to pn
A, as shown in equation (14),
is also decreasing in the degree of insecurity (τ) and the number of
groups competing for the territory under dispute (N).
(ii) Autarkic aggregate welfare under no conﬂict, ¯ Wn
A, is always higher
than autarkic aggregate welfare under conﬂict, ¯ W∗
A.
4.2 Free trade
Under free trade, each group can trade, without restrictions, butter and oil at
a relative price p which is determined in international markets. Moreover, we
suppose that this price cannot be inﬂuenced by any group or by the country
as a whole. In other words, the country can be considered “small”.24 Using





p(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi
, (16)
21Using the simpliﬁed solution for ¯ W
n∗
A shown in footnote 17, it is possible to rewrite
(15) as ¯ W
∗
A = ¯ W
n∗
A φ where φ ≡ [Nβ/(Nβ + ατ(N − 1))]
β. Since φ < 1 whenever τ > 0
given N > 1, it follows that ¯ W
∗
A < ¯ W
n∗
A .
22Note that, with variation across groups, no unique set of comparisons would exist.
Speciﬁcally, for any given distribution of the secure land endowment, (1 − τ)¯ T, across
i along with the implied gun expenditures and expected winner of the contested land,
τ ¯ T, in the conﬂict case, there are many possible allocations of the country’s entire land
endowment ¯ T in the no conﬂict case.
23It should be fairly obvious, given the result that autarkic price depends only on ag-
gregate quantities and our homothetic speciﬁcation for preferences that, while the pre-
sentation above is based on the assumption of identically distributed endowments, these
ﬁndings extend beyond the symmetric case.
24Supposing that the groups and the country as a whole are large enough to aﬀect
international prices, and that they recognize their eﬀects in their strategic decisions would
unnecessarily complicate our derivations without qualitatively changing our results. In
a similar model, but with a focus on conﬂict between nations instead of that within
nations, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) allow for a strong eﬀect of individual players
on international prices.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 14
where as deﬁned above G represents the vector of gun choices by all groups





GipT0 − 1) = 0,
from which we can solve for the equilibrium production of guns under trade





(N − 1)pτ ¯ T
N2 , (17)
for all i, where τ ≡ T0/¯ T. Note that, even when the secure land endow-
ments are not identically distributed across groups, the equilibrium would
be symmetric. That is, provided the relevant resource constraint is satisﬁed,
groups of diﬀerent sizes will produce the same quantity of guns.
What relevant resource constraints do we have in mind? Since groups
have, by assumption, access to international markets, it seems reasonable to
suppose that they can trade the right to obtain guns beyond what can be
obtained domestically (that is, beyond Li), against the oil that can be ob-
tained from the group’s secure land endowment (Ti) alone, or even against
the oil that the group expects to obtain from its participation in the do-
mestic conﬂict (q(Gi,G−i)T0). As Collier et. al. (2003, p. 77) state: “A
particularly remarkable recent development is for rebel groups to raise ﬁ-
nance by selling the advance rights to the extraction of minerals that they
currently do not control, but which they propose to control by purchasing
armaments ﬁnanced through the sale of extraction rights.” Former Presi-
dent of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lawrence Kabila, ﬁnanced his
rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko with such a scheme. Similarly, Ross
(2003, p. 33) cites reports of former President of Congo-Brazzaville Denis
Sassou-Nguesso ﬁnancing his private militias through pledges of future oil
contracts, whereby he was able to come to power. Over the past decade,
buying arms in international markets has become far easier than it had been
in the past. Indeed, there now exist international private security ﬁrms that
oﬀer comprehensive packages, including everything from tactical advisors to
whole units complete with attack helicopters and jets. Such military “im-
ports” have been decisive factors in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola
[see Davis 2000 and Singer 2003].
In accordance with such practices, we assume here that, in the free trade
regime, groups can borrow against their expected land holdings (Ti + qiT0)
to procure guns in international markets at their domestic opportunity cost.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 15
Then, the optimizing guns choice for each group i is G∗
T as shown in (17).
However, for the sake of completeness, we do consider in the appendix the
alternative case where groups cannot trade in arms globally.25
Then, combining (17) with (16) shows that group i’s equilibrium ex-
pected payoﬀ under free trade, Wi∗
T (p), equals:
Wi∗



















i = 1,2,...,N. Since G∗
T is the same for all i, each group has an equal chance
of securing T0. Thus, as (18) and (19) show, under free trade, any variation
in secure endowments across groups will be fully reﬂected in variation in
their expected payoﬀs for any given price.26
But, under the assumption of identical groups, aggregate welfare and the










 ¯ T (20a)
= ¯ Wn
T (p) − µ(p)pN−1
N τ ¯ T (20b)
pmin =
αNl
βN − βτ(N − 1)
(20c)
Then, the properties described below follow straightforwardly.
Proposition 2 (Free Trade) Suppose the competing groups are identical.
(i) The international price that minimizes the country’s aggregate welfare
under trade and conﬂict (pmin) is strictly greater than the autarkic
price under no conﬂict (pn
A), and is increasing in the degree of insecu-
rity (τ) and the number of groups competing for the insecure property












βN + ατ(N − 1)
βN − βτ(N − 1)
are both increasing in the degree of insecurity, τ.
25See Appendix B.1. This case is interesting in its own right, but it also has some
important policy implications that complement our ﬁndings.
26Strictly speaking, this result requires that, if there is any variation in the distribution
of land endowments across groups, the degree of variation should not be too large.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 16
(ii) For any given international price p, aggregate welfare under conﬂict,
¯ W∗
T(p), is strictly lower than aggregate welfare under no conﬂict, ¯ Wn
T (p).
Furthermore, the higher is the degree of insecurity (τ), the lower is
¯ W∗
T(p).
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is to be expected, as insecurity induces arming that
reduces welfare. The interpretation and signiﬁcance of part (i) will become
evident in the next section in our comparison of the two trading regimes.
5 Comparing the two trading regimes under conﬂict
Having characterized the allocation of resources under the two polar trading
regimes, we are now ready to compare them in terms of both arming and
welfare. The comparison reveals two key forces at play here: (i) the well
known gains from trade that favor trade over autarky, as was demonstrated
above in the benchmark case without conﬂict; and (ii) the induced eﬀects of
trade openness on the groups’ incentive to ﬁght over the contested resource,
which may or may not favor trade over autarky.
Consider ﬁrst the level of arming. Note that, whereas guns under autarky
depend only on the endowments and other parameters of the model as shown
in (13a), guns under free trade critically depend on the relative price p and
positively so as shown in (17). Using (13a) and (17), we calculate the ratio of










As this expression shows, gun choices under free trade are larger than that
under autarky if and only if the international relative price of guns is higher
than the autarkic price.
The logic here is straightforward: A high price of oil induces more pro-
duction of guns because land and oil are more valuable in international
markets and thus induce more competition for the capture of the contested
land. When θ > 1 the groups and the country as a whole export oil. By con-
trast, when θ < 1, oil is less valuable internationally than it is domestically
and the country imports oil and produces fewer guns than under autarky.
Moving on to the relative appeal of free trade, note that the payoﬀs under
autarky equal the payoﬀs under free trade if the international price equals
the autarkic price: ¯ W∗
T(p∗
A) = ¯ W∗
A. Since ¯ W∗
T(p) is strictly quasi-convex in p
and obtains its minimum at pmin, how welfare under free trade, ¯ W∗
T(p), ranks
relative to welfare under autarky, ¯ W∗
A, depends on how pmin is related to theGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 17
autarkic price p∗
A. In particular, if these two prices were to coincide, then the
expected payoﬀs under autarky would fall below the expected payoﬀs under
trade everywhere except at that minimum price. However, from Proposition
2 part (i) we have pmin > pn
A and from Proposition 1 part (i) we have
pn
A > p∗
A. Therefore, we must have pmin > p∗
A, implying that there exists
some range of international prices for which the groups are better oﬀ under
autarky than under trade.
But we can be more precise in characterizing this range of prices. In
particular, given the strict quasi-convexity of ¯ W∗
T(p), there exists another
price p0 > pmin deﬁned uniquely by the condition, ¯ W∗
T(p0) = ¯ W∗
A, such
that for all e p ∈ (p∗
A,p0), the expected payoﬀs under free trade are lower
than the payoﬀs expected under autarky ( ¯ W∗
T(e p) < ¯ W∗
A), whereas for prices
outside that interval the payoﬀs expected under trade are at least as high as
those expected under under autarky ( ¯ W∗
T(e p) ≥ ¯ W∗
A). This range of prices is


















Figure 2: Free trade with conﬂict
We summarize the key implications of our analysis as they relate to the
welfare comparison of the two regimes in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade) Suppose the competing
groups are identical.
(i) When the international price of oil p is lower than p∗
A or higher thanGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 18
p0, welfare under free trade is higher than welfare under autarky.
(ii) When the international price of oil is between p∗
A and p0, welfare under
autarky is higher than welfare under free trade.
(iii) The price p0 is increasing in the degree of insecurity τ. The ratio p0/p∗
A
is increasing in the degree of insecurity τ as well. Thus, the range of
prices for which autarky dominates trade is increasing in the degree of
insecurity.
When the international price for oil p is lower than its autarkic price
(p∗
A), the production of guns under trade is lower. In this case, removing
the barriers to trade reduces the groups’ incentives to ﬁght over the contested
resource, implying that domestic conﬂict is less intense. With this beneﬁt
and the familiar gains from trade, there should be no doubt that welfare
is higher than it would be under autarky. However, as the international
price of oil rises, domestic conﬂict intensiﬁes, becoming just as severe as it
is under autarky once the international price reaches the price that obtains
under autarky (p = p∗
A) while, at the same time, the gains from trade fall
to zero. It is at this point, as shown in Figure 2, that welfare under autarky
coincides with welfare under free trade.
As the international price continues to rise above the autarkic level, do-
mestic conﬂict intensiﬁes further. But while the gains from trade rise above
zero, these gains are not suﬃciently large to compensate for the higher bur-
den of guns; thus, as the international price of oil rises above the autarkic
price, welfare under free trade falls below its autarky level. Yet, as Proposi-
tion 3 indicates, further increases in the international price of oil eventually
make free trade relatively more appealing. That is to say, when the interna-
tional price of oil becomes suﬃciently high (p > p0), the gains from winning
the valuable land and selling the oil in the global marketplace become very
large and outweigh the welfare cost of guns.
Part (iii) of the Proposition, the proof of which is given in the appendix
(A), establishes that the range of international prices for which autarky is
superior to trade (p ∈ (p∗,p0)) expands as insecurity (τ) increases, an intu-
itively plausible but non-trivial property. Figure 3 illustrates this property
and also shows how an increase in the degree of insecurity shifts the welfare
curve under free trade down.
As noted above, both p∗
A and pn
A are increasing in the labor-land endow-
ment ratio l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T. One can verify from (20c) that pmin is also increasing
























Figure 3: When the degree of insecurity rises
in a rightward shift in the welfare curves drawn in Figure 2.27 A larger l
implies a wider range of international prices for which free trade is superior
(i.e., p < p∗
A), since the country is an importer of oil and an exporter of
butter over that range.
Throughout this analysis, we have assumed that, in the free trade regime,
groups are able to procure arms in global markets, borrowing against their
expected land holdings, ¯ T/N, such that the labor resource constraint, ¯ L/N−
G∗
T > 0, never binds. Without questioning the relevance of this assumption,
it seems worthwhile to note when global trade in arms is prohibited and
conﬂict is suﬃciently severe (as determined jointly by τ and N) such that
groups exhaust their labor endowment in guns production alone, the range of
prices for which autarky dominates free trade becomes a subset of the range
as characterized here. Furthermore, the width of that range is decreasing in
the degree of insecurity. These ﬁndings suggest, what upon some reﬂection
should not be too surprising, that prohibiting trade in arms with countries
where domestic conﬂict prevails can enhance the appeal of globalization.28
27It is not possible to sign dp
0/dl generally; however, it is possible to verify, for suﬃciently
large l, that p
0 is also increasing in l.
28See Appendix B.1 for details and additional results.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 20
6 Further implications
Our analysis above shows clearly that the presence of insecure property,
which paves the way for domestic conﬂict, can have important implications
for the relative appeal of free trade. In this section, we present two additional
implications of our framework. These similarly regard the eﬀects of insecure
property on trade and welfare; however, they also underscore the importance
of careful measurement and interpretation of the data. The ﬁrst follows
immediately from our previous discussion in connection with Proposition 3
and is illustrated in Figure 2. It concerns the welfare eﬀect of an increase
in the international price of the contested resource.
Proposition 4 (Resource Curse) Suppose the competing groups are iden-
tical. Then, for international prices between p∗
A and pmin, aggregate welfare
under free trade, ¯ W∗
T(p), is decreasing in the international price p.
This ﬁnding is similar in spirit to what others (including, but not lim-
ited to, Sachs and Warner 1995 and Ross 2003) have called the “resource
curse,” but is based on a diﬀerent logic. In particular, as suggested ear-
lier, for p ∈ [p∗
A,pmin), increases in the international price of the contested
resource induce a greater degree of domestic conﬂict. While the familiar
gains from trade increase with increases in p over this range, these increases
are swamped by even larger increases in the burden of guns. Part (i) of
Proposition 2 implies further that the range of prices for which welfare is
decreasing in the international price, (p∗
A,pmin), depends positively on the
degree of insecurity τ.29
It is important to note, in connection with the resource curse, that na-
tional income under free trade, given by
¯ R∗
T(p) = [p(1 − N−1
N τ) + l]¯ T,
is everywhere increasing in the international price p, even over that range for
which welfare is falling. Thus, particularly for p ∈ [p∗
A,pmin), our measure
of income tends to overstate welfare. But, there is no reason to believe that
commonly used measures of aggregate income (e.g., GDP) do any better.
If anything, there is reason to believe that they do worse. Speciﬁcally, our
29However, as shown in the appendix, prohibiting trade in arms could truncate the
range of prices for which welfare is decreasing in the international price. See Appendix
B.1 for further details. In that appendix, we also consider in more detail the qualitative
relation between the width of the price range for which the resource curse is relevant and
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theoretical construct, in contrast to conventionally used measures based on
national income and product accounts, excludes expenditures on arming.
Thus, the conventional measures of national income would tend to overstate
welfare by even more than our theoretical measure. But the point here is
not to “advocate” our theoretical measure. Instead, the point is to note that
reports of income founded on conventional income accounting might not be
able to identify fully the extent of the natural resource curse. Accordingly,
the curse itself might be not only more severe but also more pervasive,
aﬀecting more countries than currently believed.30
Another implication of the analysis that we point out here is that con-
ﬂict also aﬀects the pattern of trade. Speciﬁcally, when p ∈ (p∗
A,pn
A), the
presence of insecure land endowments reverses the direction of the country’s
comparative advantage relative to the hypothetical scenario where land en-
dowments are perfectly secure. To illustrate this eﬀect, we calculate the
country’s aggregate excess demand for oil under free trade, in the hypo-
thetical case of no conﬂict ( ¯ Mn
T(p)) and the more realistic case of conﬂict
( ¯ M∗
T(p)), combining (5) with (3) and making the appropriate substitutions
for pn
A from (8), p∗
A from (13b), and G∗
T from (17):
¯ Mn




















By deﬁnition, each measure is positive when the country imports oil and
negative when it exports oil. More importantly, as (21a) reveals, in the
absence of conﬂict, the country would import oil whenever p < pn
A. But (21b)
shows that if, at the same time, p > p∗
A, then under trade with conﬂict, the
country would export oil. This sharp divergence in the pattern of trade stems
from the eﬀect of insecure property (τ > 0) to divert resources (speciﬁcally
labor in this model) away from butter production to guns production. Part
(i) of Proposition 1 implies that the range of prices under which such a
divergence in the pattern of trade in oil emerges, (p∗
A,pn
A), is increasing in
the degree of insecurity, τ.31
30Candidates for this designation would be countries that have, for example, low ranks
in term of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) compared to their rank in terms
of GDP. Such countries appear to fall into one of either two categories: those that are
signiﬁcant oil exporters (like Saudi Arabia or Angola) and those that have signiﬁcant
domestic cleavages (like Algeria and South Africa). See the table for HDI at the following
web site: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/index.html.
31Note that, under the assumption that groups can trade in guns as well as in oil and
butter in world markets, insecurity’s eﬀect to push the country to export oil does notGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 22
However, the inﬂuence of insecurity on a country’s pattern of trade is
not limited to cases where the price of oil falls within that particular range.
Equation (21b) shows that a country’s excess demand for oil is increasing
in p∗
A, which Proposition 1 part (i) indicates is decreasing in the degree of
insecurity. Thus, the degree of insecurity, τ, generally reduces the country’s
excess demand for oil, thereby imparting a positive bias on the country’s
exports of the contestable resource for all p. We summarize these ﬁndings
in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Trade Pattern Eﬀects) The domestic demand for oil is
decreasing in the degree of insecurity τ, and the country over-exports oil
(relative to the hypothetical no-conﬂict case). When the international price
of oil is between p∗
A and pn
A, there is a reversal in the country’s compara-
tive advantage (relative to the no conﬂict case), with the country exporting
instead of importing oil.
In oil-exporting countries where there is domestic conﬂict over that same
resource, we would expect these exports to be higher than those that would
obtain in the absence of conﬂict. If, for example, the resources expended
on Nigeria’s civil wars and the various other forms of domestic conﬂict that
have been present there over the years were instead used in production, the
local economy would have absorbed more of the oil production and less of
it would have been exported.
To be sure, this trade-pattern eﬀect extends to more general produc-
tion functions for guns, as well as for butter and oil. Within a modiﬁed
structure of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, what matters is how factor
intensities compare across industries and relative to the country’s labor-land
endowment ratio, l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T.32
7 Concluding remarks
Since 1945, 127 civil wars (each causing, by deﬁnition, at least 1,000 deaths)
have emerged in 73 countries. The total number of casualties resulting
directly from these wars is conservatively estimated to be at least 16.2 mil-
lion.33 The accompanying direct and indirect economic costs have also been
necessarily mean that insecurity simultaneously pushes the country to import butter. An
oil-exporting country could (i) export butter, while necessarily importing guns, or (ii)
import butter, while either importing or exporting guns.
32For details, please see the supplementary appendix, Appendix B.2.
33See Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) who base their ﬁndings on the Correlates of War
project, among other sources. Using Singer and Singer (1994) updated to include theGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 23
immense. These wars have not abated since the end of the Cold War; they
have spread into Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Collier et. al, 2003,
Ch.4), and many pre-existing wars last longer than they had in the past
[Fearon and Laitin, 2003]. Furthermore, low-level insurgencies, civil unrest,
and more conventional forms of domestic conﬂict are present in an addi-
tionally large number of countries, and these have their own added costs
(Rodrik, 1999).
Our ﬁndings suggest that, without conﬂict-minimizing governance, glob-
alization’s eﬀects can signiﬁcantly deviate from those predicted by tradi-
tional trade models where all endowments are considered perfectly secure.
Although for importers of oil and other natural resources opening up the
economy brings the regular beneﬁts of trade and reductions in conﬂict, for
exporters of the same resources opening the economy to trade can very well
induce increased conﬂict costs that more than oﬀset the familiar gains from
trade. Welfare can even fall when the price of the exported resource rises,
and the country in conﬂict might be exporting a good that it would be
importing in the absence of conﬂict.
The increase in domestic conﬂict observed in the post-war period is
also correlated with the emergence of weak new post-colonial and post-
communist states that have been unable to develop the legal infrastructure,
enforcement, and institutions which would be expected to manage the var-
ious conﬂicts. As even the strong states of high-income countries are said
to be weakening in many of the same dimensions (see, e.g., Van Creveld,
1999), one may reasonably question whether any signiﬁcant progress can be
made to improve the governance of security in low-income countries without
qualitative changes in the way the international economy is governed.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3, part (iii).
As noted earlier, p0 is deﬁned by W∗
T(p0) = W∗
A, which, using (15) for W∗
A
and (20a) for W∗
T(p0), can be written as

βNl






p0(1 − τ N−1
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
= 0. (A.1)
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The expression on the right hand side of the equality above is strictly pos-
itive, implying A > 0. To sign B, note that (20c) implies pmin = αl/β[1 −Globalization and domestic conﬂict 27
τ N−1
N ]. From the inequality p0 > pmin, it follows that p0β





and therefore B < 0. With (A.2), the inequalities A > 0 and B < 0, in turn,
imply that the price p0 is increasing in the degree of security τ: ∂p0/∂τ > 0.
Then, with Proposition 1 part (i), that p∗
A is decreasing in τ, one can verify
that the ratio, p0/p∗
A, is increasing in τ. k
B Supplementary appendices
B.1 Restricted (free) trade
In this appendix we consider the implications of a restricted trade regime.
That is to say, we suppose that groups cannot procure arms in global markets
when Li < G∗
T, even when they can trade in both butter and oil. Under the
maintained assumption that endowments are identically distributed, impos-
ing this restriction implies that the resource constraint in arms production
will bind for all groups if the international price for oil exceeds some thresh-






In turn, with (13b), it is possible to verify that p∗
A < pc < ∞, provided
there is some degree of insecurity, τ > 0, given N > 1.34
Now, when p ≤ pc, the representative group’s optimizing choice of guns,
denoted here by Gu∗
RT, is identical to the solution shown in (17); otherwise
it is given by the group’s labor endowment, Gc∗
RT = ¯ L/N. Accordingly, from




RT(p) = µ(p)¯ T

p(1 − N−1
N τ) + l

if p ≤ pc
¯ Wc∗
RT(p) = µ(p)¯ Tp if p > pc,
(B.2)
where, as previously deﬁned, µ(p) ≡ ββ(α/p)α. Obviously, ¯ Wu∗
RT(p), which
represents aggregate welfare when the resource constraint is not binding,
is identical to that when “free trade” means “unrestricted trade”, ¯ W∗
T(p),
as shown in (20a)—all goods (oil, butter and guns) can be freely traded
in the world market, all groups can use their future oil earnings from the
land they appropriate as collateral for their current gun purchases, and the
international price of guns equals the domestic (and constant) marginal cost.
¯ Wc∗
RT(p) represents aggregate welfare when only oil and butter are traded
globally and the international price is suﬃciently high to render trade not
34Since the resource constraint for arms production is not relevant under autarky, p
∗
A is
identical to that which was derived in the main text.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 28
only restricted, but also resource constrained. All labor is expended in the
production of guns, and no butter is produced domestically in the restricted
trade regime.
Using (B.1), (B.2) and (20a), one can show that, for all p > pc, the
following holds: ¯ Wc∗
RT(p) > ¯ W∗
T(p). This inequality underscores the poten-
tial value of prohibiting global trade in arms—namely, as a commitment
mechanism when the state’s institutions of governance and enforcement are
suﬃciently weak. In particular, by limiting trade to only oil and butter,
it is possible to impose at least some discipline on the contesting groups,
and thereby limit the wasteful absorption of resources into guns. Indeed,
ruling out trade in arms between nations could enhance the relative appeal
of trade between countries in other goods where property is insecure and
hence domestic conﬂict prevails.
To proceed, observe that, since ¯ Wu∗
RT(p) = ¯ W∗
T(p), the properties of
¯ Wu∗




A) = ¯ W∗
A; and, provided τ > 0, ¯ Wu∗
RT(p) is strictly quasi-convex
in p, reaching a minimum at pmin > p∗
A, where pmin is shown in equation
(20c). Furthermore, it is easy to verify, using (B.2), that d ¯ Wc∗
RT(p)/dp > 0.
Then it follows that there exists some range of international prices of oil,
(p∗
A, e p), for which groups are better oﬀ under autarky than under restricted
free trade. More importantly, this range could diﬀer from that when groups
are permitted to trade in arms as well as in butter and oil, (p∗
A,p0), as was
characterized in Proposition 3. The key in identifying these diﬀerences lies
analyzing the determination of ˜ p, to which we now turn.
First recall that p0 is deﬁned as the maximal solution to ¯ W∗
T(p) = ¯ W∗
A,
which implies that dp0/dτ > 0.35 Now deﬁne p00 analogously as the (unique)
solution to ¯ Wc∗
RT(p) = ¯ W∗





βN + ατ(N − 1)
. (B.3)
This solution shows that dp00/dτ < 0.
One can then show that e p = min{p0,p00}, where by the properties of
¯ Wu∗
RT(p) and ¯ Wc∗
RT(p) and the deﬁnition of pc, we have the following:
p00 S p0 ⇐⇒ pc S p00. (B.4)
This set of related inequalities, in turn, implies that there exists a critical
degree of security, which equates pc shown in (B.1) and p00 shown in (B.3),
35Also see Appendix A.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 29
as follows














given α ∈ (0,1) and N that ensure e τ ∈ (0,1], such that
e p =

p0 if τ ≤ e τ
p00 if τ > e τ.
(B.6)
Now, if τ ≤ e τ, the degree of insecurity and, given the number of competing
groups, the resulting intensity of conﬂict is not suﬃciently severe to make
the labor resource constraint in guns production bind. In this case, the range
of oil prices in global markets under which autarky dominates restricted free
trade (consumption goods alone) corresponds to the range of prices under
which autarky dominates unrestricted free trade (consumption goods and
arms): (p∗
A,p0). By Proposition 3 (iii), this range is increasing in the degree
of insecurity, τ.36
However, if τ > e τ, which is more likely, given the degree of insecurity, the
larger is the number of groups in competition for control over the natural
resource (N), the range of international prices under which autarky dom-
inates restricted free trade, (p∗
A,p00), is a subset of the range under which
autarky dominates unrestricted free trade, (p∗
A,p0). In this case, conﬂict is
suﬃciently severe to push groups to employ their entire labor endowments
in the production of guns; yet, the restriction on trade in arms precludes
any additional diversion of resources, thereby neutralizing at least some of
the conﬂict-enhancing eﬀect of free trade (as identiﬁed in the main text).
Furthermore, one can easily verify that the width of the price range (p∗
A,p00)
is decreasing in degree of insecurity τ. Given that the intensity of conﬂict is
suﬃciently severe (as determined jointly by τ and N), there exists a range
of international prices, under which prohibiting trade in arms enhances the
relative appeal of global trade, even if restricted.
These results suggest that prohibiting global trade in guns can also have
important implications for the range of international prices under which the
aggregate welfare is decreasing in the international price (akin to the “nat-
ural resource curse”). Recall that for the case of unrestricted free trade,
36One related possibility is that, depending on preferences (α) and the number of groups
(N), e τ > 1. In this case, since τ ≤ 1 by construction, τ < e τ, regardless of the degree of
security, and hence, from (B.6), ˜ p = p
0. In fact, for any ﬁxed value of N > 1, there exists
an α, αo(N) ∈ (0,1) such that e τ > 1 for all α ∈ (0,αo(N)). This reasoning suggests, in
turn, that there exists a set of (α,N) pairs such that ˜ p = p
0 for any degree of insecurity,
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that range is (p∗
A,pmin), with pmin ≡ argmin ¯ Wu∗
RT(p), which is shown in
(20c). From our results to this point, it follows that ¯ W∗
RT(p) is strictly
quasi-convex in p, with a kink at p = pc and a unique minimizer, denoted
by pR·min ≡ argmin ¯ W∗
RT(p). Since ¯ Wc∗
RT(p) is increasing in p, the value
of pR·min depends on whether the resource constraint is binding at an in-
ternational price for oil which falls above or below pmin. More precisely,
pR·min = min{pc,pmin}.
Now deﬁne b τ ≡ b τ(α,N) as the critical value of τ that equates pc and
pmin. From (B.1) and (20c), this critical value is given by




for α ∈ (0,1) and N that ensure both b τ ∈ (0,1]. As the right hand side of
this expression clearly shows, b τ is linear in α and decreasing in both α and
N. From (B.5) and (B.7), we can see that b τ(α,N) > e τ(α,N) for parameter
values that ensure b τ ≤ 1 and e τ ≤ 1. It is now easy to verify that
pR·min =

pmin if τ ≤ b τ
pc if τ > b τ.
(B.8)
Since p∗
A < pc < ∞ for all τ > 0 given N > 1, whenever p ∈ (p∗
A,pR·min),
welfare under restrictive free trade, ¯ W∗
RT(p) is decreasing in the interna-
tional price. If τ ≤ b τ, then this price range corresponds to the analogous
one derived in the case of unrestricted free trade, (p∗
A,pmin). Furthermore,
the width of this range of prices is increasing in the degree of insecurity.
However, if τ > b τ, the price range under which the natural resource curse
occurs, (p∗
A,pc), is a subset of the analogous price range in the case of unre-
stricted free trade. Moreover, the width of the price range is decreasing in
the degree of security, τ, given N.
Figure B.1 combines some of the central results of this appendix to show
how the inﬂuence of prohibiting trade in arms depends qualitatively on
the degree of insecurity. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure distinguishes between three
possibilities, regarding insecurity (τ):37
(i) Case 1: τ = τx ∈ (0,e τ]. When the degree of insecurity is relatively
mild, prohibiting trade in arms inﬂuence neither the range of prices
for which autarky dominates free trade, (p∗
A, ˜ p) nor the range of prices
37The ﬁgure assumes that b τ ≤ 1. As drawn in the ﬁgure, an increase in τ causes a
downward shift in both ¯ W
u∗
RT(p) and ¯ W
∗
A as described in the main text, but as suggested
above ¯ W
c∗
RT(p) does not depend on τ.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 31
under which aggregate welfare is decreasing in the international price
under the trade regime, (p∗
A,pR·min): ˜ p = p0 and pR·min = pmin. Still,
for a suﬃciently high price, the labor constraint will bind.
(ii) Case 2: τ = τy ∈ (e τ,b τ]. When the degree of insecurity rises slightly,
prohibiting trade in arms will aﬀect the range of prices under which
autarky dominates free trade, (p∗
A, ˜ p), but not the range of prices under
which aggregate welfare is decreasing in the international price under
the trade regime, (p∗
A,pR·min): ˜ p = p00 < p0, but pR·min = pmin.
(iii) Case 3: τz ∈ (b τ,1]: When the degree of insecurity is relatively severe,
prohibiting trade in arms aﬀects both the range of prices under which
autarky dominates free trade, (p∗
A, ˜ p) and the range of prices under
which aggregate welfare is decreasing in the international price under
the trade regime, (p∗






























τx ∈ (0,e τ]: ˜ p = p0 < pc
x and pR·min = pmin
τy ∈ (e τ,b τ]: pc
y < ˜ p = p00 < p0 and pR·min = pmin
τz ∈ (b τ,1]: pc
z < ˜ p = p00 < p0 and pR·min = pc
z < pmin
Figure B.1: When trade in arms is prohibitedGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 32
The ﬁgure also illustrates how a discrete increase in the degree of in-
security, where the initial degree of insecurity is suﬃciently high to make
the labor constraint binding, truncates the range of prices for which autarky
dominates free trade. Furthermore, the ﬁgure clearly shows that, even where
the degree of insecurity is mild, prohibiting trade in arms can have beneﬁcial
eﬀects, further enhancing the overall gains from globalization. As predicted
by the theory of the second-best, given the already-existing distortions in-
duced by insecurity, introducing another (by restricting trade) can enhance
aggregate welfare.
B.2 General production structures and the patterns of trade
Here we outline an extension of our model in which the production struc-
ture is generalized along the lines of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of
trade, to show how our results regarding the pattern of trade extend with
some qualiﬁcations. For simplicity we focus on the case where only oil and
butter can be trade internationally. As before, denote the relative price
of oil (measured in units of butter) by p. Now let the price of labor and
the price of land be denoted respectively by w and r, and assume that all
commodities can be produced using land and labor with constant returns
to scale technologies. For speciﬁcity, identify the corresponding technologies
for the production of these goods, J = O,B,G, with the unit cost functions
cJ ≡ cJ(w,r), which we assume are linear homogeneous and concave in their
arguments. By Shephard’s lemma, cJ
w and cJ
r indicate respectively the (con-
ditional) unit labor and unit land requirements in the production of good
J, where the subscript denotes the partial derivative of the cost function
with respect to that factor price. The linear homogeneity of cJ implies that
the unit labor and land requirements are homogenous of degree zero and
further that the labor-land factor intensity ratio in industry J, lJ ≡ cJ
w/cJ
r,
is decreasing in the wage-rental ratio, ω ≡ w/r.
Within this more general production structure, supposing that labor
(land) is employed intensively in the production of butter (oil)—that is,
lB(ω) > lO(ω) for all relevant ω—we identify the conditions under which (i)
the autarkic relative price of oil in the presence of conﬂict continues to be
below that which obtains in the “Nirvana” case; and, (ii) there is a tendency
to over-export oil in the presence of conﬂict relative to the Nirvana case.38
The key condition for both results, given lB(ω) > lO(ω), is that the coun-
38While consistent with the production structure speciﬁed in the main text, this as-
sumption on factor intensities is not as restrictive and, moreover, is not important for the
central result of the paper that trade openness can aggravate domestic conﬂict.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 33
try’s (and, under symmetry, the representative group’s) labor-land factor
endowment ratio l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T is higher than the labor-land factor intensity
ratio in the production of guns: lG = cG
w/cG
r . Otherwise, the results are
reversed. Either way, we can see that the country’s pattern of trade will
depend on the presence of conﬂict.
B.2.1 The eﬀect of conﬂict on the autarkic price
Focusing on diversiﬁed production for oil and butter, with the price of butter
normalized to one, competitive pricing requires
cO(w,r) = p (B.9a)
cB(w,r) = 1. (B.9b)
Under our assumptions, these two conditions together deﬁne the equilibrium
values of w and r as functions of product prices. An application of the
implicit function theorem to (B.9) conﬁrms, consistent with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, that an exogenous increase in the relative price of oil (p)
generates a disproportionate increase in the reward to the factor employed
intensively in this industry (land), while reducing the real reward paid to
the other factor (labor): prp/r > 1 and wp < 0, where the subscript denotes
the partial derivative with respect to that variable.
Let ¯ XJ ≡
PN
i=1 Xi
J denote the country’s aggregate output of J = O,B,
and recall that ¯ G ≡
PN
i=1 Gi indicates the country’s aggregate allocation to
guns.39 Then, given the quantities of labor and land resources allocated pro-
duce ¯ G, factor-market clearing requires the residual quantities of labor and
land, ¯ L−cG
w ¯ G and ¯ T −cG
r ¯ G, be allocated to the production of consumption
goods, ¯ XJ, J = B,O, as follows:
cO
w ¯ XO + cB
w ¯ XB = ¯ L − cG
w ¯ G (B.10a)
cO
r ¯ XO + cB
r ¯ XB = ¯ T − cG
r ¯ G (B.10b)
We will later refer to the ratio ¯ lX ≡








land residual factor endowment ratio.
With the country’s factor endowments, ¯ L and ¯ T, the two conditions
shown in (B.10) pin down the aggregate quantities of oil and butter that
will be supplied by the country, ¯ XO and ¯ XB, as functions of ¯ G and p. For
our purposes, it suﬃces to solve these equations for the relative supply of




B denote group i’s output levels of oil and
butter, respectively, contingent on the realization, e T
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oil function (measured in units of butter):









lB − ¯ lX

 ¯ lX − lO
. (B.11)
Conﬂict’s eﬀect on the autarkic price operates partly through ¯ G’s eﬀect
inﬂuence on this relative supply of oil. To evaluate this eﬀect, ﬁrst observe
that an increase in aggregate guns, ¯ G, given p, reduces the residual quantities
of both labor and land available for the production of consumption goods.
Nevertheless, we can pin down net eﬀect of the increase in ¯ G on ¯ lX, as it
depends on the diﬀerence between the labor-land factor endowment ratio,








r (l − lG)¯ T
(¯ T − cG
r ¯ G)2 T 0 if l T lG.
Whether positive or negative, the change in ¯ lX then directly aﬀects the









(¯ lX − lO)2 < 0,
where the inequality, consistent with the Rybczynski theorem, follows from
the assumption that labor is employed intensively in the production of but-








S 0 if l T lG. (B.12)
If the labor-land factor endowment ratio is less than the labor-land factor
intensity of guns production, l < lG, an exogenous increase in ¯ G decreases
disproportionately the residual amount of labor available for the production
of oil and butter; the resulting decline in ¯ lX implies an increase in the relative
supply of oil, measured in units of butter; otherwise, the eﬀect is reversed.
Next, we derive the equilibrium condition for the relative price of oil
under autarky. Let Ri ≡ R(p, e Ti−cG
r Gi,Li−cG
wGi) denote group i’s revenue
or GDP function contingent on the realization of the outcome of contest for
land, e Ti. As before, this function is the maximized value of the group’s
40One can show more generally, with an application of the implicit function theorem
to (B.10), that an increase in the quantity of land (labor) used to produce oil and butter
leads to a disproportionate increase in the output of the industry that uses the factor
intensively, oil (butter), and a decrease in the output by the other industry, butter (oil).Globalization and domestic conﬂict 35
gross domestic product or, equivalently, the minimized value of the group’s
expenditures on land and labor in the production of oil and butter:
Ri = pXi
O + Xi
B = r[e Ti − cG
r Gi] + w[Li − cG
wGi]. (B.13)
It is well-known that Xi
O = Ri
p, w = Ri
L, and r = Ri
T, where the subscripts
on R denote partial derivatives with respect to that variable [Dixit and
Norman (1980)].41
Maintaining the linear homogeneous speciﬁcation for the representative
consumer’s preferences, group i’s indirect utility function can be written
as V i = µ(p)Ri where as previously deﬁned µ(p) is the marginal utility of
income, with µ0 < 0 and µ00 > 0. From Roy’s identity, group i’s contingent
demand function for oil is Di
O = α(p)Ri/p, where α(p) ≡ −pµ0(p)/µ(p) > 0
is the expenditure share on oil.42 It follows that group i’s excess demand
function for oil is Mi ≡ Di
O − Xi
O = α(p)Ri/p − Ri
p.
When there are no barriers to trade, the international price p is taken
as given. The country as a whole can be either a net importer
PN
i=1 Mi ≡
¯ M( ¯ G,p) > 0 or a net exporter ¯ M( ¯ G,p) < 0. Under autarky, however, the
country can be neither. But since domestic markets are fully integrated, the
autarkic price, pA, is the price, given the allocation of guns by all groups,
that satisﬁes the condition, ¯ M( ¯ G,p) = 0. This condition implicitly deﬁnes
the equilibrium price of oil, p = pA, in units of butter, as a function of the
country’s aggregate endowments, given the aggregate allocation to guns, ¯ G.
To derive that condition, deﬁne the country’s aggregate revenue (or
GDP) function as ¯ R = R(p, ¯ T − cG
r ¯ G, ¯ L − cG
w ¯ G). One can verify that
¯ R ≡
PN
i=1 Ri and further that ¯ Rp =
PN
i=1 Ri
p (= ¯ XO). The condition
for the autarkic price is then
¯ M( ¯ G,p) =
α(p)
p













1+ρ, the fraction of the country’s GDP that comes from
oil production. This fraction can be written as a function of the country’s
41Sharply pronounced asymmetries in the groups’ contingent endowments can induce
complete specialization in the production of oil or butter by some groups. Allowing for
such specialization would require signiﬁcant changes in the analysis. But, to keep focused
on the issues at hand, we consider only the case of diversiﬁed production.
42With linear homogeneous preferences, denoted by U
i, group i’s expenditure function




0(p) > 0 and e
00(p) < 0, where
primes denote derivatives. One can easily verify that (1) µ(p) ≡ 1/e(p); (2) α(p) ≡
−pµ
0(p)/µ(p) = pe
0/e(p) > 0; (3) pα
0(p)/α(p) + α(p) − 1 = pe
00(p)/e
0(p) < 0.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 36
relative supply of oil. By applying the implicit function theorem (B.14), we




¯ M ¯ G
¯ Mp
(B.15)
Tedious algebra shows that, ¯ Mp < 0, the condition for Walrasian stability,
is satisﬁed.43 Hence, the sign of (B.15) is given by that of ¯ M ¯ G.
From (B.14), market clearing requires α(p) − p ¯ Rp/ ¯ R = 0. Using that
requirement with the observation that p ¯ Rp/ ¯ R = ρ/(1 + ρ), one can verify






Accordingly, by our assumption that lB > lO, we can use (B.12) to ﬁnd
∂pA
∂ ¯ G
S 0 if l S lG. (B.16)
Thus, consistent with our ﬁnding in the main text, provided that butter
is labor intensive lB > lO and the labor-land factor intensity ratio in the
production of guns exceeds the labor-land factor endowment ratio lG > l,
an exogenous increase in ¯ G implies an increase in pA. It should also be clear
by now that, as before, the autarkic price is independent of the outcome of
the conﬂict. That is, pA is not subject to uncertainty.
B.2.2 The eﬀect of conﬂict on the pattern of trade
To this point we have derived the equilibrium relationship between the rel-
ative price under autarky and the aggregate quantity of guns. Nothing has
43Using (B.14), calculate:

























Since ¯ R/p 6= 0, market-clearing requires ¯ Rp = α ¯ R/p. Algebraic manipulations and sub-
stitutions, with that requirement, show that the ﬁrst three terms can be written as
α ¯ R[pα
0/α − 1 + α]/p
2, which is negative since α, the expenditure share for oil, is less
than 1 and decreasing in p [also see footnote 42]. Furthermore, the country’s supply of oil









rrr/w. As such, one can simplify the last two
terms of the expression as −wr c
G
wr (rp/r − wp/w)
2 < 0. Since c
G
wr > 0 and rp > 0, while
wp < 0, this simpliﬁed term is similarly negative. Thus, ¯ Mp < 0.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 37
been said, however, about the optimizing choice of guns under either trade
regime.
To proceed, we can deﬁne group i’s expected payoﬀ, as Wi = µ(p)b Ri,
where b Ri is given by (B.13) with e Ti replaced by Ti + qiT0. Focusing on
identical groups, it is straightforward to show that the optimizing choice of









where r depends on p as shown in (B.9). Aggregating this condition across
all groups i, using qi




G i = µ(p)

(N − 1)T0r/ ¯ G − NcG
= 0 (B.17)
It follows that ¯ G∗ = T0
N−1
N (cG/r)−1. Since cG depends on factors prices,
which in turn depend on price p, this solution and the Stolper-Samuelson
























The inequality follows from our assumption that lB > lO, as it implies
that prp/r > 1 and wp < 0. Now note that (B.17) together with (B.14)
determine p∗
A and ¯ G∗
A > 0. (B.17) alone determines ¯ G∗
T > 0. It should now
be fairly clear how trade patterns where conﬂict is present compare with
trade patterns in our hypothetical case of peace.
(i) Suppose that l < lG for all ¯ G ∈ [0, ¯ G∗
A], so that p∗
A < pn
A. Then,
for any world price p ∈ (p∗
A,pn
A) the country will import oil under
“Nirvana” and export oil under conﬂict if it could trade freely in the
world market.
(ii) Suppose that l > lG for all ¯ G ∈ [0, ¯ G∗
A], so that p∗
A > pn
A. Then, for any
world price p ∈ (pn
A,p∗
A), the country will export oil under “Nirvana”
but import oil under free trade with conﬂict.